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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) achieved super-human per-
formance in a broad variety of domains. We say that
an AI is made Artificially Stupid on a task when some
limitations are deliberately introduced to match a hu-
man’s ability to do the task. An Artificial General In-
telligence (AGI) can be made safer by limiting its com-
puting power and memory, or by introducing Artificial
Stupidity on certain tasks. We survey human intellec-
tual limits and give recommendations for which limits
to implement in order to build a safe AGI.
Introduction
The Turing Test [1] was designed to replace the philosophi-
cal question "Can machines think ?" with a more pragmatic
one: "Can digital computers imitate human behaviors in an-
swering text questions ?" Since 1990, the Loebner Prize
competition awards the AI that has the more human-like be-
haviour when passing a five-minutes Turing Test. This con-
test is controversial within the field of AI for encouraging
low-quality interactions and simplistic chatbots [2].
Programmers force chatbots to make mistakes, such as
typing errors, to be more human-like. Because computers
achieve super-human performance in some tasks, such as
arithmetic [1] or video game [3], their ability may need to be
artificially constrained. Those deliberate mistakes are called
Artificial Stupidity in the media [4] [5].
Solving the Turing Test problem in its general form im-
plies building an AI capable of delivering human-like replies
to any question of human interest. As such, it is known to be
AI-Complete [6], because by solving this problem we would
be able to solve most of problems of interest in Artificial In-
telligence by reformulating them as questions during a Tur-
ing Test. To appear human, an AI will need to fully under-
stand human limits and biases. Thus, the Turing Test can be
used to test if an AI is capable of understanding human stu-
pidity.
By deliberately limiting an AI’s ability to achieve a task,
to better match humans’ ability, an AI can be made safer,
in the sense that its capabilities will not exceed by sev-
eral orders of magnitude humans’ abilities. Upper-bounds
on the number of operations made per second by a human
brain have been estimated [7] [8]. To obtain an AI that does
not exceed by far humans’ abilities, for instance in arith-
metics, the computing power allowed for mathematical ca-
pabilities must be artificially diminished. Besides, humans
exhibit cognitive biases, which result in systematic errors in
judgment and decision making [9]. In order to build a safe
AGI, some of those biases may need to be replicated.
We will start by introducing the concept of Artificial Stu-
pidity. Then, we will recommend limitations to build a safer
AGI.
Artificial Stupidity
Passing the Turing Test
To pass the Turing Test, programs that are deliberately sim-
plistic perform better at Turing Test contests such as the
Loebner Prize. The computer program A.L.I.C.E. (or Artifi-
cial Linguistic Internet Computer Entity) [10] won the Loeb-
ner Prize in 2000, 2001 and 2004, even though "there is no
representation of knowledge, no common-sense reasoning,
no inference engine to mimic human thought. Just a very
long list of canned answers, from which it picks the best
option" [11]. A.L.I.C.E. has an approach similar to ELIZA
[12]: it identifies some relevant keywords and give appropri-
ate answers without learning anything about the interrogator
[11].
A general trend for computer programs written for the
Loebner prize is to avoid being asked questions it cannot
answer, by directing the conversation towards simpler con-
versational context. For A.L.I.C.E. and ELIZA, that means
focusing mainly of what had been said in the last few sen-
tences (stateless context). Another example of an AI per-
forming well at Turing Test contests is Eugene Goostman,
who convinced 33% of the judges that it was human [13].
Goostman is portrayed as a thirteen-year-old Ukrainian boy
who does not speak English well. Thus, Goostman makes
typing mistakes and its interrogators are more inclined to
forgive its grammatical errors or lack of general knowledge.
Introducing deliberate mistakes, what we call Artificial Stu-
pidity, is necessary to cover up an even greater gap in intel-
ligence during a Turing Test.
Interacting with Humans
Outside those very specific Turing Test contests, Artificial
Stupidity is being increasingly introduced to interact with
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humans. In “Artificial Stupidity: The Art of Intentional Mis-
takes”[3], Liden describes the design choices an AI pro-
grammer must make in the context of video games. He gives
general principles that a Non-Player Character (NPC) must
follow to make the game playable. For instance, NPCs must
"move before firing" (e.g. by rolling when the player enters
the room) so that the player has additional time to under-
stand that a fight is happening, or "miss the first time" to in-
dicate the direction of the attack without hurting the player.
In video games, because computer programs can be much
more capable than human beings (for instance because of
their perfect aim in First Person Shooters (FPS)), develop-
ers force NPCs to make mistakes to make life easier for the
human player.
This tendency to make AI deliberately stupid can be ob-
served across multiple domains. For example, at Google
I/O 2018, Sundar Pichai introduced Google Duplex, "a new
technology for conducting natural conversations to carry out
“real world” tasks over the phone"[14]. In the demo, the
Google Assistant used this Google Duplex technology to
successfully make an appointment with a human. To that
end, it used the interjection "uh" to imitate the space filler
humans use in day-to-day conversations. This interjection
was not necessary to make the appointment. More precisely,
when humans use these kind of space fillers, it is a sign of
poor communication skills. The developers introduced this
type of Artificial Stupidity to make the call more fluid, more
human-like.
Exploiting Human Vulnerabilities
When interacting with AI, humans want to fulfill some basic
needs and desires. The AI can exploit these cravings, by giv-
ing people what they want. Accordingly, the AI may want
to appear vulnerable to make the human feel better about
himself. For instance, Liden [3] suggests to give NPCs "hor-
rible aim", so that humans feel superior because they think
they are dodging gunshots. Similarly, he encourages "kung-
fu style" fights, where amongst dozens of enemies, only two
are effectively attacking the player at each moment. Thus,
the player feels powerful (because he believes he is fighting
multiple enemies). Instead of unleashing its full potentiality,
the AI designers diminish its power to please the players.
The same mechanism applies to the computer program
A.L.I.C.E.. The program delivers a simple verbal behav-
ior, and because "a great deal of our interactions with oth-
ers involves verbal behavior, and many people are interested
in what happens when you talk to someone"[11], it fulfills
this elementary craving of obtaining a verbal behavioral re-
sponse. In his "Artifical Stupidity" article, part 2, Sundman
quotes Wallace, the inventor of A.L.I.C.E, explaining why
he thinks humans enjoy talking to his program: "It’s merely
a machine designed to formulate answers that will keep you
talking. And this strategy works, [...] because that’s what
people are: mindless robots who don’t listen to each other
but merely regurgitate canned answers."
More generally, virtual assistants and chatbots are tech-
nologies aimed at helping consumers. To that end, they must
provide value. They might achieve that by gaining users’
thrust and improving their overall well-being. For instance,
Woebot, a Facebook chatbot developed by Stanford Re-
searchers, improves users’ mental-health through Cognitive
Behavorial Therapy (CBT) [15]. In addition to CBT, Woebot
uses two therapeutic process-oriented features. First, it pro-
vides empathic responses to the user, according to the mood
the user said he had. Second, content tailored to its mood is
presented to the user. [16]. The chatbot delivers specifically
what will help the user best, without describing the details
of the user’s mental-health. It gives a very simple answer the
consumer wanted, masking the intelligence of its algorithm.
Chatbots are designed to help humans, giving appropriate
simple responses. They are not designated to appear smarter
than humans.
Avoiding Superintelligence requires
Superintelligence
In "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" [1], Turing ex-
poses common fallacies when arguing that a machine cannot
pass the Turing Test. In particular, he explains why the belief
that "the interrogator could distinguish the machine from the
man simply by setting them a number of problems in arith-
metic" because "the machine would be unmasked because of
its deadly accuracy" is false. Indeed, the machine "would not
attempt to give the right answers to the arithmetic problems.
It would deliberately introduce mistakes in a manner calcu-
lated to confuse the interrogator." Thus, the machine would
hide its super-human ability by giving a wrong answer, or
simply saying that he could not compute it. Similarly, in a
video game, AI designers artificially make the AI not omni-
scient, so that it does not miraculously guess where each and
every weapon of the game is located [3].
The general trend here is that AI tend to quickly achieve
super-human level performance after having achieved
human-level performance. For instance, for the game of Go,
in a few months, the state-of-the-art went from strong am-
ateur, to weak professional player, to super-human perfor-
mance [17]. From that point onwards, to make the AI pass a
Turing Test, or make it behave human-like to satisfy human
desires, AI designers must deliberately limit its capabilities.
We now take the point of view of algorithmic complexity.
We call AI-problems the problems that can be solved (i.e. for
which the correct output for a given input can be computed)
by the union of all humans [6]. The Turing Test is said to be
AI-complete [6], because all AI-problems can be reduced via
a polynomial-time reduction to it (by framing the problem
as a question during a Turing Test), and it is an AI-problem.
Additionally, we say that a problem is AI-Hard if we can find
a polynomial-time reduction from an AI-complete problem
to this problem. In this setting, the problem of comprehen-
sively specifying the limits of the human cognition to an AI
is AI-Hard. Indeed, it implies being capable to know which
questions a human can answer in a given time during a Tur-
ing Test, and which answers are likely to be produced by
humans. Therefore, the Turing Test can be reduced polyno-
mially to specifying the limits of human cognition, so spec-
ifying such limits is AI-Hard.
Although the precise limits of human cognition are not
fully known, specific recommendations on minima or max-
ima for different capabilities can be given.
The Cognitive Limits of the Human Brain
I believe that in about fifty years time it will be possible
to programme computers, with a storage capacity of
about 109, to make them play the imitation game so
well that an average interrogator will not have more
than 70 percent chance of making the right
identification after five minutes of questioning.
Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 1950
Sixty-eight years ago, Turing estimated that in the 2000s,
an AI with only 1 Gb in storage could pass a five minutes
Turing Test 30% of the time. Previously, we showed that
passing the Turing Test in general was AI-complete. The
amount of computing resources necessary to pass the Tur-
ing Test is then a relevant estimate for determining the com-
puting power necessary to attain Human-Level Machine In-
telligence (HLMI). In what follows, we try to estimate the
computing power of the human brain.
Limits in Computing
The brain is a complex system with an architecture com-
pletely different from the usual von Neumann computer ar-
chitecture. However, estimates about the storage capacity of
the brain and the number of operations per second were at-
tempted.
Long-term Memory Here is how Turing [1] justifies the
109 bits of storage capacity:
“Estimates of the storage capacity of the brain vary
from 1010 to 1015 binary digits. I incline to the lower
values and believe that only a very small fraction is
used for the higher types of thinking. Most of it is prob-
ably used for the retention of visual impressions.”
The storage capacity of the brain is generally considered
to be within the bounds given by Turing (resp. 1010 and
1015). Although the encoding of information in our brains is
different from the encoding in a computer, we observe many
similarities [18].
To estimate the storage capacity of the human brain, we
first evaluate the number of synapses available in the brain.
The human brain has about 100 billion neurons [19]. Each
neuron has about five thousand potential synapses, so this
amounts to about 5.1014 synapses [8], so 5.1014 potential
datapoints.
This shows that the brain could in theory encode be-
tween 1012 and 1015 bits of information, assuming that each
synapses stores one bit. However, such estimates are still
approximate because neuroscientists do not know precisely
how synapses actually encode information: some of them
can encode multiple bits by transmitting different strengths,
and individual synapses are not completely independent
[20].
Processing Even though the brain can encode Terabits
of information, humans are in practice very limited in the
amount of information they can process.
In his classical article [21], Miller showed how our minds
could only hold about 7 ± 2 concepts in our working mem-
ory. More generally, three essential bottlenecks were shown
to limit information processes in the brain: the Attentional
Blink (AB) limits our ability to consciously perceive, the
Visual Short-Term Memory (VSTM) our capacity to hold
in mind, and the Psychological Refractory Period (RFP) our
ability to act upon the visual world [22]. In particular, the
brain takes up to 100ms to process complex images [23].
Moreover, the processing time seems to take longer when
the choice to make takes as input a complex information.
This is known as Hick’s Law [24]: the time it takes to make
a choice is linearly related to the entropy of the possible al-
ternatives.
Computing One approach to evaluate the complexity of
the processes happening in the brain is to estimate the max-
imum number of operations per second. Thus, Moravec [7]
estimates that to replicate all human’s function as a whole
one would need about 100 MIPS (Millions of Instructions
per Second), by comparing it to the computational needs for
edge extraction in robotics. Using the same estimation for
the number of synapses in the brain (mentioned in Memory),
Bostrom [8] concludes that the brain uses at most about 1017
operations per second (for a survey of the different estimates
of the computational capacity of the brain, see (Bostrom,
2008) [25]).
Clock Speed The brain does not operate with a central
clock. That’s why the term "clock-speed" does not describe
accurately processes happening in the brain. However, it if
possible to compare the transmission of information in the
brain and inside a computer.
Processes emerge and dissolve in parallel in different
parts of the brain at different frequency bands: theta(5-8Hz),
alpha(9-12Hz), beta(14-28Hz) and gamma(40-80Hz). Com-
paring computer and brain frequences, Bostrom notes that
“biological neurons operate at a peak speed of about 200
Hz, a full seven orders of magnitude slower than a modern
microprocessor (~2 GHz)” [26].
It is important to note that clock speed, alone, do not fully
characterize the performances of a processor [27]. Further-
more, the processes happening in the brain use several orders
of magnitude more parallelization than modern processors.
Cognitive biases
Humans, like other animals, see the world through the
lens of evolved adaptation
The Evolution of Cognitive Bias, 2005 [9]
Natural selection have shaped human perception, with the
constraint of limited computational power. Cognitive biases
led humans to draw inferences or adopt beliefs without cor-
responding empirical evidence. The fundamental work of
Tversky and Kahneman [28] highlighted the existence of
heuristics and systemic errors in judgment. However, those
biases helped to solve adaptive problems, i.e. “problems that
recurred across many generations during a species’ evolu-
tionary history, and whose solution statistically promoted re-
production in ancestral environments” [29].
Limited rationality The economist Herbert A. Simon op-
posed the classical view of the rational economic agent.
He viewed humans as organisms with limited computational
powers, and introduced the concept of bounded rationality
to take those limits into account in decision-making. [30].
Cosmides and Tobby also criticized the study of eco-
nomic agents as following "rational" decision rules, with-
out studying the "computational devices" inside. Natural se-
lection’s invisible hand created the human mind, and eco-
nomics is made of the interactions of those minds. Evolu-
tion led humans to develop domain-specific functions, rather
than general-purpose problem-solvers. The intelligence of
humans comes from those specific "reasoning instincts" that
make inferences “just as easy, effortless, and "natural" to hu-
mans as spinning a web is to a spider or building a dam is to
a beaver” [29].
Heuristics The intractability of certain problems, the lim-
ited computational power of human minds, and uncertainty,
are the most common ways to explain cognitive biases, and
in particular heuristics, which are “rules of thumb that are
prone to breakdown in systematic ways” [9]. Heuristics aim
at reducing the cost of computing while delivering good-
enough solutions. Processes are limited by brain ontogeny,
i.e. the development of different parts of the brain, and com-
plex algorithms take longer and require additional resources.
One of the most famous bias resulting from mental short-
cuts is the "Linda Problem": individuals consider the asser-
tion "Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist move-
ment" more probable than "Linda is a bank teller". This er-
ror is caused by the conjunction fallacy, i.e. believing that
the conjunction of two events is more probable than a single
event [31]. Another notorious example is the Fundamental
Attribution Error, attributing certain mental states to individ-
uals because of their behavior, and not because of the logical
implications of the context [32] [33].
Error management biases Error Management Theory
(EMT) studies cognitive biases in the context of error man-
agement. It distinguishes two error types [9]:
• false positives (false belief)
• false negatives (failing to adopt a true belief)
One of the findings of EMT is that humans are biased to
make the less costly error, even if it is the most frequent [34].
Biases of this kind include [9]:
• Protective biases (e.g. avoiding noninfectious person)
• Bias in Interpersonal Perception (for instance sexual
overperception for male and commitment skepticism for
female)
• Positive Illusions (estimates unrealistic likelihoods for
positive events)
Artifacts Humans might appear irrational in experiments
because the tested abilities were not optimized by evolution.
Those are called biases as artifacts [9]. For instance, humans
are better at statistical prediction if the inputs are presented
in frequency form [35].
Recommendations to Build a Safer AGI
Humans have clear computational constraints (memory, pro-
cessing, computing and clock speed) and have developed
cognitive biases. An Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is
not a priori constrained by such computational and cogni-
tive limits.
Hence, if humans do not deliberately limit an AGI in its
hardware and software, it could become a superintelligence,
i.e. "any intellect that greatly exceeds the cognitive perfor-
mance of humans in virtually all domains of interest" [26],
and humans could lose control over the AI. In this section,
we discuss how to constrain an AGI to be less capable than
an average person, or equally, while still exhibiting general
intelligence. In order to achieve this, resources such as mem-
ory, clock speed, or electricity must be restricted.
However, intelligence is not just about computing.
Bostrom distinguishes three forms of superintelligence:
speed superintelligence (“can do all that a human intellect
can do, but much faster”), collective superintelligence (“A
system composed of a large number of smaller intellects
such that the system’s overall performance across many very
general domains vastly outstrips that of any current cogni-
tive system.”) and quality superintelligence (“A system that
is at least as fast as a human mind and vastly qualitatively
smarter”) [26]. A hardware-limited AI could be human-
level-intelligent in speed, but still qualitatively superintel-
ligent.
Hardware
To begin with, we focus on how to avoid speed superintelli-
gence by limiting the AI’s hardware. For instance, its max-
imum number of operations per second can be bounded by
the maximum number of operations a human does. Simi-
larly, by limiting its RAM (or anything that can be used as a
working memory), we limit its processing power to process
information at the similar rate as humans.
Focusing only on limiting the hardware is nonetheless in-
sufficient. We assume that, in parallel, there exists other lim-
itations (in software) that prevents the AI to become qualita-
tively superintelligent, to upgrade its hardware by changing
its own physical structure, or to just buy computing power
online.
Storage Capacity
I should be surprised if more than 109 was required for
satisfactory playing of the imitation game, at any rate
against a blind man. [...] A storage capacity of 107
would be a very practicable possibility even by present
techniques.
Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 1950
We estimated the storage capacity of the human brain to
be at most 1015 bits, using one bit per synapse. The cost
of hard drives have reached $0.05/Gb in 2017 [36]. Hence,
the storage capacity of a human brain would cost at most
approximately $50,000. This is a pessimistic estimate: the
brain uses maybe orders of magnitude less information for
storage, and the price of a Gb could decrease even lower in
the future.
To have a safe AGI, one should rather use much less stor-
age capacity. For instance, as quoted in the epigraph, Turing
[1] estimated 107 (or about 10Mb) to be a practical storage
capacity to pass the Turing Test (and therefore attain AGI).
Even if this seems very low, consider that an AGI could have
a very elegant data structure and semantics, that may allow
to store information much more concisely than our brains. In
comparison, English Wikipedia in compressed text is about
12Gb, and is growing at a steady rate of 1Gb/year [37]. For
this reason, allowing more than 10 Gb of storage capacity is
unsafe. With 10Gb of storage, it could have access to an of-
fline version of Wikipedia permanently, and be qualitatively
superintelligent in the sense that it would have direct access
to all human knowledge.
A counter-argument for such memory limit is that our
brains process much more information than 10Mb when ob-
serving the world, and would store all those images in our
long-term memory. The human-eye could observe, at most,
576Mb in a single glance (forgetting about all the visual
flaws) [38]. However, all this resolution is not necessary to
perform edge detection and image recognition. For instance,
a 75x50 pixels image is enough to identify George W. Bush
[39], and the popular database for handwritten digit recogni-
tion MNIST use 28x28 images [40]. Thus, we can imagine
a "visual processing unit", that would transform the photons
received by the captor of the AGI into a low resolution im-
age, precise enough to be interpreted by our AGI, but still
orders of magnitude smaller in size than a Mb.
Memory access Manuel Blum opposes the application of
traditional complexity theory to formalize how humans pro-
cess information and do mental computations, in particular
to generate a password from a private key previously mem-
orized [41]. In his Human-Model, memory can be modeled
as a two-tape Turing machine: one for long-term memory,
one for short-term memory. Blum considers potentially in-
finite tapes, because the size of the tape is not relevant for
complexity theory, but for our purpose we can consider the
tapes to be at most the size discussed previously for mem-
ory (e.g. 10Mb). According to Miller’s magical number 7±2
[21], human working-memory works with a limited amount
of chuncks. So our two-tape Turing Machine should have
a very short "short-term memory" tape, containing at most
two or three 64-bit pointers pointing to chunks in the long-
term memory (the other tape). More specifically, storing in-
formation in the long-term memory is slow, but reading from
long-term memory (given the correct pointer) is fast.
In modern computers, RAM’s bandwidth is about
10GBytes/s, hard drive’s bandwidth is 100MBytes/s, and
with high clock rate a CPU can process about 25GBytes/s
[18]. In order to build a safer AGI, the memory access for the
two mentioned tapes must be restricted, so that we are sure
that data is being retrieved slower than by humans. However,
the computing paradigms being very different, it is difficult
to give a clear estimate of how much information is being
retrieved per second by the brain [18].
Processing We previously mentioned how the human
brain could only process a limited amount of information
per second. In addition to a limited number of chunks in
working memory, other features must also be implemented
to slow down the AGI and make it human-level intelligent.
For instance, introduce some artificial period to process in-
formation, such as images, depending on the content. We
already commented on the necessary duration of 100ms to
process complex images [23]. Similarly, the amount of time
to process a certain image might depend on the complex-
ity and size of the image. More generally, a model similar
to Hick’s Law [24] can be implemented, to have the AGI
take linearly more time to take decisions as the information-
theoretic entropy of the decision increases.
Clock Speed As we mentioned multiple times, the brain
parallelizes much more, using a totally different computing
paradigm than the von Neumann architecture. Therefore, us-
ing a clock rate close to the frequency of the brain frequen-
cies (typically ~10Hz) is not relevant to our purpose, and it
might prove difficult to build an AGI that exhibits human-
level intelligence in real time using such a low clock rate.
To solve this, one possibility is to first measure better the
trajectory of thoughts occuring in the brain, and then give a
precise estimate of how frequently the processes in the brain
are refreshed (i.e. evaluating some kind of clock rate). An-
other solution is to abandon the von Neumann architecture,
and build the AGI with a computer architecture more similar
to the human brain.
Computing In "The Cognitive Limits of the Human
Brain", we mentioned Bostrom’s estimate [8] of at most 1017
operations per second for the brain. This is a very large num-
ber, and could only happen if the AGI’s hardware allowed
that much computing power. This will not be the case, ac-
cording to what we said previously in Storage capacity and
Memory access.
More importantly, even if we could measure a number of
operations per second that would actually be lower than any
number of operations per second a human brain does for any
given task, it might not be a correct bound. Why? The brain
has evolved to achieve some very specific tasks, useful for
evolution, but nothing guarantees that the complexity or the
processes happening in the brain are algorithmically opti-
mal. Thus, the AGI could possess a structure that would be
far more optimized for computing than the human brain.
Therefore, restricting the number of operations alone is
insufficient: the algorithmic processes and the structure of
the AGI must be precisely defined so it is clear that the re-
sulting processes happening are performing tasks at a lower
rate than humans.
Software
In November 2017, there were more than 45 companies in
the world working on Artificial General Intelligence [42].
Ben Goertzel distinguishes three major approaches [43]:
• 1) Use neural networks to emulate the different parts of
the brains, visual and auditory processing, and connect all
those parts together by emulating how those parts talk to
each other. Deepmind is a representative example.
• 2) Take Marcus Hutter’s Universal Artificial Intelligence
model [44] and try to limit the required computing power
• 3) Ben Goertzel’s approach with OpenCog: look at the
cognitive processes happening in the brain from a high-
level cognitive point of view, and map this into a weighted
labeled hypergraph.
In this paper, in order to build a safe AGI with at most
human intelligence, we will focus on the first approach. In-
deed, a more universal or high-level Artificial General Intel-
ligence will have a very different computing paradigm than
the human brain, so it would be difficult to restrain the AGI
computing resources accordingly.
In addition to those neural networks emulating processes
happening in the brain, we consider additional safety mea-
sures that must be implemented to obtain a safe AGI.
No self-improvement A limited initial hardware is not a
real restriction if the AGI can buy some additional comput-
ing power online or change its own structure. To prevent the
AGI from changing its own code, one possibility is to hard-
code the feature directly "you shall not rewrite your own
code". Another (subtler) possibility is to encrypt its source
code, making self-modification more difficult.
However, it might seem that this does not completely
solve the problem, as the AGI could manipulate humans into
changing its code. Yet, with our AGI design, the AGI would
not be superintelligent, but at most human-intelligent. So the
AGI would not have the necessary "social manipulation su-
perpowers" [26] to convince humans to change its code.
Cognitive Biases Humans have developed cognitive bi-
ases because of natural selection. Incorporating human bi-
ases into the AGI present several advantages: they can limit
the AGI’s intelligence and make the AGI fundamentally
safer by avoiding behaviors that might harm humans. Thus,
heuristics limiting the possible results of a computation, or
error management biases, can help build a less capable AGI
that would also make less errors.
Here is a list of cognitive biases that could make the AGI
safer [45]:
• Planning fallacy: would prohibit the AGI from success-
fully planning a takeover or a treacherous turn
• Bandwagon Effect: the AGI will acquire human values
that are shared among the group it belongs to
• Confirmation Bias: the AGI will rationalize and confirm
that it is useful to help humans, or that AI Safety is an
important problem
• Conservatism: the AGI will keep the same initial values,
and not become evil
• Courtesy bias: the AGI will try to not offend anyone,
avoiding aggressive behaviors
• Functional Fixedness: the AGI will only use objects like
humans do. It will not “hack” anything or use objects with
malicious intent
• Information bias: the AGI will have the tendency to seek
information and think more, avoiding errors
• Mere-exposure effect: the AGI will have good intention
towards humans because it will be exposed to humans
• Omission bias: bad actions will be much lower in its util-
ity function than status quo
• Status quo bias: an action that does not change the envi-
ronment or even inaction will be desirable
• Authority bias: some human values are shared among
most authority figures. The AGI will avoid extreme in-
dividual opinions and prefer conventional ones
• System justification: the AGI will defend human values,
and won’t promote revolution
• Processing difficulty effect: the AGI will prefer well-
thought arguments and well-argued ideas over simple ac-
tions or decisions that can be harmful
• Spotlight effect: the AGI will overestimate the amount of
people observing its behavior. Hence, it will behave in a
similar fashion both with high and low supervision
It is clear that some of those biases can lead to irrational
behavior. Therefore, even though those biases can lead to
safer behavior, they must be implemented with caution.
Avoiding a treacherous turn In the Chapter 8 of Super-
intelligence [26], Bostrom notes the following: behaving
nicely in a sandbox environment is a convergent instrumen-
tal goal, both for a friendly or a malicious AI. At one point,
an AI could exhibit enough intelligence to understand that it
is being observed and could restrain its own intelligence ac-
cordingly. Bostrom calls this first moment of realization “the
conception of deception”, and would be the last moment of
vulnerability where we could observe a true malicious in-
tent. After this point, the behaviors will appear "safe", until
a certain threshold is reached, where the AI does not feel
threatened anymore by its supervisors, and decides to take a
treacherous turn and reveal its true nature by taking over.
In the implementation of the AI, however, we can decide
to make it very clear what processes are happening, when,
and how much computing power it took to do each task. This
interface would allow the human supervisors to better mon-
itor the behavior of the AI in the sandbox environment, and
detect a treacherous turn. Additionally, the designers can im-
plement a safety feature that consists in preventing the AI
from erasing any of the log files, or from even knowing that
it is being observed.
Conclusion
In the history of Artificial Intelligence, one of the great-
est challenge has been to pass the Turing Test. To win at
the Imitation Game, chatbots are made Artificially Stupid.
More generally, introducing Artificial Stupidity into an AI
can improve its interaction with humans (for instance in
video-game), but can also be a safety measure to better con-
trol an AGI. In this paper, we proposed a design of a safer
and humanly-manageable AGI. It would be hardware con-
strained, so it would have less computing power than hu-
mans, but also an architecture very similar to human brains.
Additionally, some features in software might help avoid
self-improvement, a treacherous turn, or just make the AI
safer (e.g. cognitive biases).
This approach presents several limitations and makes
multiple assumptions:
• this paper is limited to the case where the first approach
to AGI (emulating a human-brain with neural networks)
is possible, and will be the first approach to succeed
• prohibiting the AGI from hardware or software self-
improvement might prove a very difficult problem to
solve, and may even be incompatible with corrigibility
• it may be impossible to build an AI that simultaneously
operates under such heavy constraints and still exhibits
general intelligence
• this approach does not generalize: it is impossible to build
a safe Superintelligence from this AGI design
Therefore, progress must still be made to generalize this
approach. Future directions of this research include:
• exploring other limits of human cognition
• determining how to apply those limits for different AGI
designs (Marcus Hutter’s approach or Ben Goertzel’s ap-
proach for instance)
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